Wednesday, October 12, 2011

Lawrence Brewer’s execution should indeed give us pause to consider our opposition to the death penalty. I agree that no crime warrants execution. That is, no criminal act causes us to forfeit our right to life. Although this assertion seems obvious to those of us who disagree with the death penalty, it remains contentious within our public discourse. After all, we already admit that committing a crime causes one to forfeit some rights. Otherwise, we would be unable to defend imprisonment, or any other restrictions or requirements currently placed on criminals. I believe that the right to life can be defended within the scope of universal human rights. However, universal human rights might prove to be equally contentious, if not more so, than the issue of the death penalty. So, I will offer an alternative justification for the right to life in the context of the criminal justice system.

The issue of what rights criminals forfeit extends beyond the death penalty, and seems salient to the problem of “mass incarceration” as a whole. In The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander describes how criminals (most of whom are young black men) are systematically disenfranchised, even after they are released from prison. They lose the right to vote and to serve on a jury, they are denied public housing and assistance, and they are often (legally) discriminated against by employers. Which rights can we rightfully deny criminals? It appears that one of the main issues with mass incarceration is that in our society criminals forfeit an unreasonable number of rights (the right to vote, to work, to housing, etc.), even for minor drug offenses. Rather than attempt to defend each of these rights individually, I believe they can be framed under a broader label: the right to a second chance. At first glance, the right to a second chance sounds rather “halmarky,” but, in fact, it has its roots in the foundation of the criminal justice system itself.

What is the purpose of the penal system? I believe that the purpose of incarceration, and the criminal justice system as a whole, is rehabilitation. Undoubtedly, justice, punishment and prevention factor into the equation as well, but at its core, the criminal system should aim at rehabilitation. This claim is not meant to argue against the idea that offenders should “pay their debt to society,” rather, it is meant to initiate a discussion about what, precisely, that debt is. The notion that felons can “pay” for their crime with some amount of jail time (or even the more lasting effects of mass incarceration) does not do justice to the crime or to the victim. By saying that a rapist has “paid” his or her debt to society by serving five, ten, or even twenty years seems to “value” that rape, and the suffering of the victim. No debt paid to society can undo the pain that a victim of rape continues to experience for the rest of their life, nor can it bring back a dead family member. Even a lifetime of hardship that a felon might face in the system of mass incarceration cannot change the past. The debt to society is not time served. The debt is rehabilitation. It is the commitment not only to never commit a crime again, but also to continue to contribute to society for the rest of one’s life. Yet, the need for felons to contribute to society is not simply their obligation, but it is their right as well. Criminals have the right to rehabilitation. They have the right to be put in a position to pay their debt to society, as well as to the dignity that that contribution entails. I will elaborate on this “right to dignity” in another post. As a result, no felon can forfeit their right to life, since to do so would be to forfeit their right to rehabilitation as well. Of course, responding to this rights claim is more difficult in the case of Lawrence Brewer or other obviously guilty violent criminals, but it is no less necessary.

Brewer’s crime is unforgivable, and it is understandable not to feel remorse at his passing. Nothing can excuse Brewer’s behavior. However, his crime does not invalidate his right to be rehabilitated. How we treat our worst is an indicator of our morals as a society. Thus, we must feel outrage at the death of Brewer just as we feel outrage at the death of Troy Davis (though perhaps in a different way). I have tried to articulate the foundations of an argument that the purpose of the justice system is rehabilitation. Moreover, rehabilitation is a right that every criminal is entitled to. This argument remains incomplete. I think the question of the purpose of the criminal justice system is extremely important, as is the question of which rights offenders forfeit. What debt is owed to society? What are our responsibilities as a community with regard to criminals? Are we all, in a way, responsible for their rehabilitation?

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